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This paper was presented to the "International Comparative Workshop on Scandal and 
Reform in Italy and Japan" at the Japanisch -Deutsches Zentrum, Berlin 19-20 August 1994, 
organised by Richard Katz and sponsored by the Conference Group on Italian Politics & 
Society and the Japan Political Studies Group. The bulk of the research was carried out 
during the author’s period as a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Political and Social 
Sciences at the European University Institute, Florence. A shorter, amended version of the 
paper will appear in a book edited by Stephen Gundle and Simon Parker, published by 
























































































































































































In his more cynical moments, Achille Occhetto, the ex-leader of the Democratic Party of the 
Left (PDS), in reviewing the current wreckage of left-wing politics in Italy, might identify 
the cause of the destruction as resting with himself, and specifically his highly individualistic 
initiative in October 1989 when he took the communist and non-communist world by surprise 
in proposing the dissolution of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its transformation into 
a non-communist patty of the left. After all, the declared objectives of this course of action 
were not limited to the party itself. On the contrary, in keeping with the most commonly- 
accepted analysis of the Italian party system, the transformation of the PCI into the PDS (and
thus the resolution of the ‘communist question’) was seen as a prerequisite to two further
1
objectives: unblocking the party system by making alternation in power possible, and the 
subsequent victory of a left-wing coalition. The causal links between the three objectives, 
then, were clear-cut from the beginning, and were based on an assumption that, since the 
power-base of the ruling Christian Democrats (DC) was anti-communism, the removal of 
communism would render their continued maintenance of power untenable. What was not 
envisaged, however, was that the successful achievement of the first two objectives would 
result, four and a half years later, in a crushing defeat of the left and the victory of the most 
right-wing governing coalition in Italy’s post-war history, containing, as it does (for the first 




Seen from this perspective, the events of the five years 1989-94 amounted to a great 
personal failure for the leader of the PDS and his resignation after the European elections in 




























































































is fully understandable. In his less cynical moments, however, Occhetto probably recognises, 
as a good - although some would doubt this - Marxist, that men do not make history in the 
manner of their own choosing and rare is it that changes to the body politic are mono-causal. 
His own role - and indeed that of the party itself - cannot be divorced from the PDS’s 
historical context and from the deep undercurrents at work in Italian politics in this period. 
Viewed from this perspective, Occhetto can be seen as a party leader navigating, for the first 
time, completely uncharted waters, the tides of which were not only difficult to see but 
constantly undergoing change. The constraints under which he made his choices were such 
that the bitter outcome should be seen more as a general failure of the forces of progress in 
post-war Italy than the failure of a single leader of the largest party of the Italian left.
This paper documents and explains the changing nature, strategy, tactics and fortunes 
of the PDS in the period between its birth and the 1994 elections, viewed in the broader 
perspective of its relationship both to the traditional parties, to the emerging forces of the 
progressive left, and in the context of the deep changes at work in Italian politics and society. 
The paper is divided into four parts. The first part analyses the birth of the PDS in the period 
1989-91 and the damaging legacy of the internally-contested PCI-PDS transformation. The 
second part evaluates the PDS's role in the period between its official birth in 1991 and the 
passing of the electoral reform bill for the Chamber of Deputies in July 1993, which 
effectively set in motion the long campaign for the national elections in 1994. The third part 
analyses the PDS’s attempt to realign the left and reassure its skeptics in the run-up to the 




























































































The Damaging Legacy of the PCI-PDS Transformation (1989-1991)
Occhetto’s decision to dissolve the PCI and create a non-communist party of the left has 
often been interpreted as a knee-jerk reaction to the revolutions in Eastern Europe. Yet, 
while it was an evident response to the revolutions and while it clearly represented a break 
with the past, it was not completely out of keeping with Occhetto’s leadership of the party 
since he took over from Alessandro Natta a little over a year before. The fact that Natta had 
(unprecedentedly) resigned the leadership over poor local election results and his failure to 
do anything about reversing a deep political, social and organisational decline, had prompted 
the new leader into carrying through fundamental changes to the party (Bull 1989). Whether 
his intentions at that stage were to lead the PCI ‘across the ford’ is not clear (and it is 
possible that he was not sure himself), but certainly the Eighteenth Congress, held in March 
1989, made major inroads into the communist identity: democratic centralism was effectively 
dissolved as an organisational principle and the party’s teleological nature finally eradicated, 
the PCI adopting democracy as an eternal value (Bull 1991a). Although the Congress was 
a huge personal success for Occhetto, the difficulties of completing the reforms became 
apparent shortly after. The congress’s new voting procedure had resulted in an increase in 
representation of the left, and it was precisely these forces which subsequently opposed the 
leadership’s proposals on the party’s heritage and its international alignment in the Summer 
of 1989. The fierce debate which ensued resulted in a hasty retreat by the leadership and an 
uneasy compromise which could not hide the deep divisions over the extent of the reform 
programme.
It was this situation - of incomplete reforms and deep divisions over them - which 




























































































Occhetto and the leadership had been praised by outsiders for the progress they had made 
on changing the party. They now found themselves derided for their conservatism and lack 
of conviction as communist parties in eastern Europe began to shed their names and symbols. 
Occhetto’s cautious renewal - a product of the PCI’s traditional slowness to change and the 
divisions inside the party - now counted for very little, and the party found itself in deep 
crisis by the Autumn of 1989. Yet, Occhetto had already achieved sufficient changes in the 
direction of liberalising the party to make a giant leap forward possible, something which 
probably would not have been possible had Natta still been leader. This is not say that 
Occhetto was simply exploiting the opportunity presented by the events in eastern Europe to 
speed up his programme of reform and overcome internal resistance by using at the outset 
an unorthodox method (virtually announcing it in a public speech before even informing the 
party officially). As already noted, the exact intentions and scope of his reform programme 
were never clear. The decision, therefore, has to be seen from the perspective of the growing 
crisis surrounding the party and the limited number of options open to him at that stage. 
Indeed, it can be argued that by October 1989 the alternatives to taking a giant leap forwards 
were hardly realistic (Bull 1991b).
The paradoxical argument that Occhetto was happy to ‘jump’ when ‘pushed’ is 
important to explaining the crisis which subsequently engulfed the party and the effects of 
the crisis on the broader Italian political environment. The fifteen month transition period 
which the PCI underwent has already been well-documented (Ignazi 1992, Daniels and Bull 
1994). Occhetto’s proposal split the party in an unprecedented manner, changing radically 
the alignments inside the party. Opposition to the proposal - amounting to approximately a 




























































































leading berlingueriani such as Natta, Pajetta and Tortorella who had until then backed 
Occhetto’s so-called nuovo corso (‘new course’). Occhetto’s support came primarily from the 
younger members of the leadership (the quarantenni or forty year olds) and younger member 
of the Ingrao left, suggesting that generational differences to some extent traversed the 
traditional internal alignments.
It took two bitterly contested congresses to transform the party. The PCI’s Nineteenth 
Congress in March 1990 (see Bull and Daniels 1990) dissolved the party and initiated a 
‘constituent phase’ during which la cosa (‘the thing’) - as the ‘non-party’ became referred 
to - was meant to be moulded into a new non-communist party for its official birth at the 
PCI’s final congress. Yet, the opposition refused to accept the Nineteenth Congress’s historic 
decision. Arguing that the PCI still, in fact, existed (because its final congress was 
scheduled) and asserting the sovereignty of the congress (i.e no congress could bind its 
successors) they proposed the creation of a ‘refounded’ communist party at the Twentieth 
Congress, and the debate which had apparently exhausted itself in the run up to the 
Nineteenth Congress rather fruitlessly continued in similar vein. In the process, reasoned 
debate about the nature and role of a new non-communist party in Italian politics was 
submerged. Moreover, a further split amongst Occhetto’s supporters (led by Antonio 
Bassolino) resulted in three motions being presented to the PCI’s Twentieth Congress in 
February 1991: for a Partito democratico della sinistra (Democratic Party of the Left - 
Occhetto), for a rifondazione comunista (communist refoundation - Tortorella), and for a 
modemo partito antagonista e riformatore (modem reforming and antagonistic party - 
Bassolino). By the eve of the Twentieth Congress there was little doubt that Occhetto would 




























































































could be convinced, when defeated, to stay in the party. This was achieved through a tactical 
radicalisation of the new party’s foreign policy on the Gulf War (then at its height), although 
this did not stop the cossuttiani from breaking away and forming a new communist party, 
Rifondazione comunista (Bull 1991c).
The manner in which the PDS was bom had a significant short-term effect on the 
changes taking place in Italian politics, and (as will be argued in the next section) on the 
long-term capacity of the new party to exploit fully those changes. In the short-term, the 
turmoil the PCI endured between October 1989 and February 1991 and its obsession with 
internal matters undermined its role in the political arena; indeed, it ceased to be an effective 
actor on the political stage. The PDS’s birth, moreover (as will become apparent below), did 
little, in the short-term, to offset this damage. This had an important impact on the governing 
parties, the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Socialists (PSI). Until then it had always been 
assumed that the ending of the ‘communist question’ would force both parties to come to 
terms with a large genuinely reformist party. However, since the resolving of the ‘communist 
question ’ was accompanied by a deep crisis of the party itself (with the prospect of its long­
term marginalisation as an electoral force), the prospect arose that coming to terms with the 
party might not be necessary at all. Consequently, they preferred simply to observe the plight 
of the PCI-PDS (the PSI adopting a particularly skeptical attitude towards the party’s 
transformation) while maintaining their apparent stranglehold on change, epitomised in the 
continued adherence to the CAF (Craxi-Andreotti-Forlani) line, forged in May 1989. This 
increased complacency - based on an assumption that the reformist space left by the PCI was 
unlikely to be filled by an alternative force which would pose a threat to their control of the 




























































































(see Bull and Newell 1993).
In short, the PCI’s role in contributing to the sea change in Italian politics in the late 
1980s and early 1990s was two-fold. First, in transforming itself into a non-communist party 
of the left it removed an important linchpin blocking the system. True, it was not solely this 
which accounted for the subsequent changes (see Bull and Newell 1993: 206-15) and, 
furthermore, it can, of course, be seen itself as simply a product of the end of communism 
in eastern Europe. Yet, the rapidity with which Occhetto responded to the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall (his proposal to dissolve the party was made only five days after) certainly made 
a crucial difference to the speed of the changes. Second, the subsequent crisis of the party 
during and immediately after its formal transition also ensured that the changes would be 
significant by paradoxically prompting complacency in the DC and PSI and thus a failure on 
their part to react to the deep undercurrents of change at work in Italian politics. Occhetto’s 
decision, then, was a true watershed in the development of the Italian political system.
Yet, the ability of the PDS to exploit the situation which it had (partly) created for 
itself depended on other more long-term factors. Specifically, to be - or stay - in the 
vanguard of the changes engulfing the system and thus inherit the fruits of them (in the form 
of entering government) the party needed to be strong, united, sufficiently ‘new’ and with 
a feasible alliance strategy. But, as will be argued below, these four qualities were 
undermined at the outset by the manner of the new party’s birth and were then exacerbated 
by the particular direction which events in Italy followed. This ensured that the PDS’s 
attempt (already undermined by the emergence of the Northern Leagues and the referenda 




























































































a collapsing regime - would prove to be a far more complicated operation than expected.
The PDS on the Edge of the Vortex: Agent of Change or Vestige of the Old Regime? 
(1991-1993)
U"
In one sense, the situation in which the PDS found itself in the period between June 1991 - 
the referendum on preference voting and the Sicilian elections, which together marked the 
first rumblings of the imminent electoral earthquake (Bull 1992) - and the electoral reform 
of July 1993 (which set in motion all parties’ tactics for the 1994 national elections) was 
quite favourable. The PDS was the only established party organisation to remain substantially 
intact. By mid-late 1993, the membership of the DC and PSI had effectively collapsed under 
the weight of exposed corruption and it was clear by then that their electoral support would 
be wiped out at the next elections. The PDS had 800,000 members, 16.5 per cent of the 
national vote (in 1992, and most of which it expected to hold on to), an infrastructural 
patrimony estimated in billions of lire, and a wide network of sponsored social and media 
activities. If, therefore, there existed an established and natural pivot around which a genuine 
alternative to the collapsing regime could be constructed the PDS seemed to be the obvious 
candidate.
There were, however, several factors which worked against the PDS in this period_____ ... ..-4.
and restricted its room for manoeuvre. Not only was the party’s strength declining but Italy’s 
transition threw up a number of issues (participation in a transitional government, future 
political allies, electoral reform, exposure of corruption) which the party was forced to tackle 
and which exposed the deep divisions which had been carried into the new party (despite the 




























































































Congress, which had helped to avoid a major split of the ingraiani (such a split, of course, 
would have struck an even mightier blow to the strength of the party’s membership and 
electorate). In spite of the internal shake up caused by the transformation, the conflict 
between the ‘Democratic Communists’, the riformisti (reformists) and a centre faction around 
Occhetto were essentially products of the historic divisions in the PCI. Moreover, in an 
organisation freed of the formal mechanisms of democratic centralism (and one which
ensured the different factions’ representation in the leading party organs), and in a rapidly 
changing political environment which required new strategic choices to be made, deep 
conflict became endemic and paralysed any attempt at effective leadership. Indeed, the party 
found itself continually on the edge of the vortex which had already claimed the DC and PSI, 
and therefore adopting a strategy less of directing Italy’s transition than of reacting to events
and trying to ensure its own survival. Its claimed status to be a party of ‘the new’ rather than------------------_ ---------------
of the old system of power was always in doubt.
Electoral and Organisational Strength
Despite remaining organisationally intact, the PDS was a much weaker party than its 
communist predecessor. The PDS emerged from its first major electoral test (the 1992 
national elections) with a 10.5 per cent drop in the share of the vote enjoyed by the PCI in 
1987 (McCarthy 1993; Bull and Newell 1993: 216-7). Its 16.1% share of the vote 
represented an unprecedented haemorrhage of votes. Even if one were to add the share of 
the vote won by Rifondazione comunista (5.6 per cent), the ‘political space’ previously 
occupied by the PCI shrank by 4.9%, not an inconsiderable amount in the Italian party 
system. Its lead over the PSI shrank to 2.5% compared with 12.3% in 1987, the PSI 
emerging as the leading party of the left in 44 of the 94 provinces compared to its lead in




























































































only nine in 1987; all this when the PSI’s vote itself fell by 0.7%, indicating that the 
rebalancing on the left - even though this itself was to be temporary - was due entirely to the 
drop in the PDS’s vote. The party suffered losses in all regions of the country, with most 
marked losses focused in the industrialised belts of the North with high concentrations of 
manual workers and areas of the South where its vote was halved compared with that of 
1987.
The fiercely-contested transformation from the PCI to the PDS also cost the 
organisation 330,240 members between 1990 and 1991. This figure was over three times as 
high as the 1989-90 loss and eight times as high as the 1988-89 loss, and it was to decline 
by approximately a further 200,000 in the following year and a half. In addition, the 
accumulated debts of the party’s central administration were, by the end of 1992, 44 miliardi, 
to which should be added 120 miliardi of debts for the daily L ’Unità and a further 40 for 
other editorial activities (L ’Espresso 3 October 1993: 45). This decline not only confirmed 
that the PDS was failing to arrest a long-term decline in the PCI’s support, but that this trend 
was accelerating as a result of: the lengthy period of turmoil the party had undergone; the 
alienation of traditional communist militants caused by the transformation of the PCI; and 
the presence of a new party to the PDS’s left (Rifondazione comunista) which competed with 
it for the PCI’s electoral patrimony. The long-standing dilemma, therefore, of where to target 
new votes was not resolved by the birth of the PDS. Occhetto’s objective, affirmed at the 
Twentieth Congress, was that the PDS would broaden the electoral constituency of the old 
PCI by attracting disillusioned Socialist voters, ‘progressive catholics’, the ‘hidden left’ and 
first-time voters. The 1992 elections seemed to be confirmation that the PDS was failing to 





























































































The question arose as to whether or not the PDS should assist in stabilizing the Amato (1992- 
93) and Ciampi (1993-94) governments either through supporting or participating in them. 
Were these governments fundamental to the transition which the Italian republic was 
undergoing or were they simply last gasps of the old regime? In the crisis which followed 
the 1992 elections - when a government could not be formed and President Cossiga 
subsequently resigned in a gesture of desperation - there was much speculation as to the 
likelihood of the PDS being persuaded to join the government. The PDS resisted any such 
notions not only because of Craxi’s continued hostility towards the PDS but because such a 
move would make the party more vulnerable to the electoral challenge posed by the Lega and 
Rifondazione comunista and would alienate the left of the party (Heilman 1993: 149-50). The 
party could not be seen to be propping up a government which - despite its self-proclaimed 
status as ‘transitional’ - survived through the support of the old parties of government. 
Occhetto stated that a fundamental condition for PDS participation in government was "the 
non-participation in such a government of men and women who participated in the old 
regime” (La Repubblica, 8 August 1993). The government was subjected to fierce criticism 
and a no-confidence motion. Yet, members of the right of the party were never happy with 
this position. Still basing their strategy on a governing alliance with the PSI and believing 
that it was important to participate positively in the transition to the new, several leading 
party members (such as Gianfranco Borghini, Michele Magno and Filippo Cavazzuti) openly 





























































































This festering divide was brought out fully over the question of participation in the 
Ciampi government which was formed after the referenda in April 1993. Amato, in his 
resignation speech, announced the ‘death of a regime’, and Scalfaro’s appointment of the first 
non-party Prime-Minister in the Republic’s history was meant to symbolise the genuinely 
transitional nature of the new government, something confirmed by Ciampi himself who 
limited his government’s objectives to carrying through the Finance Bill and electoral reform 
for the Chamber of Deputies. The former, for Occhetto, was a prerequisite to the holding 
of further elections, and the party agreed to holding three Ministries. Yet, he was also aware 
that there were many in the party, including his own deputy, Massimo D’Alema, who had 
deep reservations about the PDS participating in a government led by the epitome of the 
establishment (the ex-Govemor of the Bank of Italy), alongside a number of faces from the 
old nomenclature. Consequently, when, the day after the birth of the government. Parliament 
refused to lift Craxi’s parliamentary immunity for four of the six requests by the magistrates 
(which the editor of La Repubblica, Eugenio Scalfari described, as "the gravest day in the 
history of our Republic, save the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro"2), Occhetto did not 
hesitate to pull his Ministers out (the Greens and Republicans doing likewise).
As Ciampi pointed out, there was no formal connection between the formation of the 
government and the behaviour of the parliament supporting it, but Occhetto unmistakedly saw 
the political implications of participating in a government whose parliament was now openly 
discredited. Yet, the alternative to participation - outright opposition along the lines that the 
left of the party wanted - would be equally unrewarding. It would fail to achieve electoral 
reform and would be perceived by many as hindering Italy’s transition. Consequently, the 




























































































by the whole affair. The ‘Democratic Communists’ toed the party line but only, noted 
Tortorella, out of respect for party discipline (Ingrao’s daughter, in fact, voted against the 
government). The right of the party, and particularly Vincenzo Visco, who was Ciampi’s 
Minister of Finance for about eleven hours, disagreed with the decision to pull out the 
Ministers and saw it as a further compromise by Occhetto to avoid a rupture with the left.
The Search fo r  Political Allies
The divisions over the PDS’s role in relation to government during the transition period were 
a reflection of the broader problem of the party’s alliance strategy. The PCI had long been 
divided over this question. Paradoxically, at the moment when the right of the party could 
have hoped to have its way (because of the increasing marginalisation of the left in the new 
party) its long-proposed strategy (of a political alliance with the PSI as the cornerstone of an 
alternative government) was becoming untenable. Indeed, a combination of the PSI’s 
collapse, splits in the traditional parties and the emergence of new umbrella movements re­
opened the question of the PDS’s future allies and threw the party into turmoil. Symptomatic 
of the confusion was the leadership’s decision, in early 1993, to flirt with the Lega, despite 
having, until then, presented the PDS as a bastion of protection against the movement. 
Claudio Pettrucioli argued that the Northern Leagues were no longer a taboo for the left and 
Massimo D ’Alema emphasised the positive aspects of the changes which their policies had 
undergone. This brought a hostile reaction from Ingrao who reminded the leadership that he 
had not taken out life membership of the party (and, in fact, he left the party in May of that 
year).3 More importantly, the birth of the Democratic Alliance (Alleanza Dentocratica
in early 1993 with Mario Segni at its head openly divided the party. In May 1993 22 PDS 




























































































Bordon and the editor of L ’Unita, Walter Veltroni) approved a document giving full support 
to AD. They saw it as the beginning of a new party of the centre-left within which the PDS 
might ultimately dissolve itself. 53 parliamentary members opposed the move, fearing that 
party members’ insertion into an umbrella organisation of the centre-left could only weaken 
the party, and announced their intention of creating a genuine alliance of the left. This 
question - as will be seen in the next section - would become critical after the passing of the 
electoral reform bill in the Summer of 1993.
Electoral Reform
The leadership’s tackling of this issue was more controversial than any other, and saw 
leading party members campaigning on opposite sides in the referendum campaign.4 A 
fundamental part of Occhetto’s original ‘new course’ (i.e. before the dissolution of the PCI) 
had been using institutional reform to unblock the political system. Reforms were to be 
proposed which would provide parties with an incentive to ally together (on the left and 
right) and this incentive, accompanied by changes to the PCI itself, would provide the 
conditions for achieving alternation in government. This led the PCI into criticising - for the 
first time in its history - the principle of proportional representation as it operated in Italy 
and then into proposing an electoral system (doppio tumo) modelled on the lines of the 
French second ballot system (see Occhetto 1987 & 1988). This system would effectively 
force voters to choose between a left and right coalition of forces with the PCI/PDS as the 
dominant left force, thus undermining the DC’s central fulcrum position and opening the way 
to alternation in government.




























































































unity on this line, the main impetus to achieve electoral reform came, from 1991 onwards, 
from forces who did not favour the PDS’s doppio tumo. When Mario Segni launched his 
‘Referendum Pact’ to achieve electoral reform, the leadership decided - despite the 
reservations of the left - to sign it, even though Segni favoured a plurality system. For the 
PDS, the problem with this system was that psephological predictions suggested that the 
system’s effect would be to divide the country geographically and ideologically into three 
with the Lega dominating the north, the PDS the centre and the DC the south. Ideologically, 
this would leave the DC still in the centre thus providing it with as much a pivotal role as 
ever. When the referendum on the Senate’s electoral system (which would introduce a 
‘mixed’ system: majoritarian with a proportional element) was eventually declared to be 
constitutionally admissible by the Constitutional Court in January 1993 the PDS’s dilemma 
was complete: the leadership was strongly in favour of electoral reform in principle, but the 
referendum would create an electoral system the party did not, in fact, want and which 
would, in all likelihood, lead to a similar reform being implemented in the Chamber of 
Deputies.
Losing control over the direction of the electoral reform programme resulted in a deep 
division inside the party, with the two wings openly campaigning against each other. The left 
of the party around Ingrao refused to support a reform which would increase the centrality 
of the DC, and found itself allied in the ‘no’ campaign with the Greens, the Rete, 
Rifondazione Comunista and the MSI. The majority of the party, meanwhile, found itself in 
alliance with Segni and the traditional ruling parties which had seen that if some kind of 
electoral reform was inevitable, this one was probably more desirable than others. Abse 




























































































the doppio tumo could subsequently be achieved for the Chamber of deputies if the ‘si’ 
campaign for the Senate was successful. However, as Salvati (1993: 118-21) points out, 
standing for ‘No’ was hardly a viable choice because of the significance that the yes/no 
dichotomy had acquired in the electorate. The general changes which were sweeping through 
the Italian body politic had become indelibly associated with a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. 
This despite the fact that the traditional parties ‘of the system’, against which the people were 
apparently voting (and against which they had voted in the 1991 referendum), had joined the 
reformist camp, and the ‘parties of opposition’ (bar the majority of the PDS) had come out 
against change. Whatever the specific consequences of the reform being passed, voting ‘yes’ 
signified, in the eyes of the Italian public, the final nail in the First Republic’s coffin. The 
result bears this out. Despite an extraordinary level of confusion during the campaign, with 
both the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ camps arguing that a majority of votes for the other side would have 
the effect of buttressing the ‘old system of power’, 82.7% voted in favour of the reform. 
Furthermore, the result, combined with similar outcomes in seven other referenda, prompted 
the resignation of the Prime Minister, Guiliano Amato who (as already noted) interpreted the 
result as effectively bringing to an end Italy’s ‘First Republic’ (Newell and Bull 1993).
The issue of electoral reform, then, split the PDS and left it in a position where its 
referendum campaign was very ambivalent. Some members campaigned against the reform, 
some members were disingenuous (arguing as if the choice was between the doppio tumo or 
no reform) and some were half-hearted, arguing that they wanted the ‘yes’ vote to succeed 
but with a substantial number of ‘no’s’ to justify the carrying through of a different type of 
reform for the Chamber of Deputies. Whether or not this last belief was held sincerely 




























































































insufficient to harness cross-party support for the introduction of the doppio tum o  in the 
Chamber of Deputies, and the PDS’s proposal was easily rejected by the Parliament and a 
‘mixed’ system adopted in the Summer of 1993.
New or Old? The PDS’s Ambivalent Identity
Even if the PCI-PDS transformation was not solely responsible for prompting the huge 
changes in Italian politics, the fact that the PCI had completed the major phase of its own 
formal changes before those changes really began, gave the party an advantageous position 
over others. Because the PDS had made a genuine attempt to change itself it was possible 
to see it as a ‘new’ party. By comparison, the DC and PSI’s subsequent attempts at change 
amounted to desperate eleventh hour attempts to recycle themselves through some cosmetic 
changes and internal splits. These parties were already in the vortex, their membership and 
support draining away fast, and the changes did little to save them. Yet, if the Twentieth 
Congress represented the end of the formal transition of the PCI into the PDS, it represented 
only the beginning of the process which would shape the new party, and this process was 
fraught with problems which undermined the leadership’s effort to present the PDS as the 
chief reformist party which could guide Italy in its transition. Three factors were particularly 
salient: organisational matters, divisions over the party’s identity, and the exposure of 
corruption.
First, organisational changes were slow to materialise and hesitant in their direction, 
as was confirmed at the party’s National Assembly held in March 1993.5 Mauro Zani, the 
Emilian leader responsible for party organisation, stated that the party recognised that the era 




























































































had to be rethought. The PDS, he said, was prepared to call its traditional form of 
organisation into question but not in the way that was being demanded by AD (dissolving the 
party and merging it into a ‘party-movement’). Yet, the PDS’s own organisational project 
was hardly convincing. Zani spoke of a ‘confederal project’ of the left within which a new 
PDS might participate. The party, he said, was involved in a big organisational experiment 
which had begun with the abolition of democratic centralism and would now move towards 
the abolition of centralism itself. Yet, the leadership was equally aware of the danger of acute 
factionalism if too much central control were relinquished. Occhetto spoke of his belief in 
a ‘third way’ between democratic centralism and factionalism which could be achieved 
through an organisation inspired by the principle of ‘decentralised centralism’ (sic), and he 
reminded the party of the necessity of internal discipline, baldly challenging (in his closing 
speech) those who were criticising him to say openly if they wished him to resign.
It was, in fact, the persistence of internal divisions (which were noted earlier) which 
hindered the new party’s consolidation. In particular, the existence, in a non-communist 
organisation, of a self-proclaimed ‘Democratic Communist’ faction weakened the claim that 
an irrevocable break with the past had occurred. Indeed, the PCI’s diversità (its claim to be 
‘different’ from other parties) which had once been an important source of cohesion in the 
party quickly became a source of conflict as party members who had opposed the change 
refused to renounce it, and even many supporting the change failed to adapt quickly to the 
need for a new culture inside the party (Bull 1994). This caused considerable disillusionment 
amongst the members of the Independent Left who had participated in the PCI’s transition, 




























































































The third factor - the exposure of corruption which threatened to engulf the PDS - 
compounded the problem and threw the leadership into a paradoxical dilemma. If, between
1992 and 1993, the magistrates’ action decimated the DC and PSI as effective political forces 
it did not leave the main opposition party untouched.6 On the contrary, by the Summer of
1993 over 70 members of the party were officially under investigation for corruption, and 
many of them had been arrested. This number was to increase considerably in the period 
after October 1993 when Craxi began co-operating with the magistrates and exposing a 
number of other apparently illicit PDS activities. The allegations to which the investigations 
led - including illegal funding from the Soviet Union, participation in a KGB-run Gladio 
network in Italy, and sharing in many of the kick-backs in contracts for transport, 
construction and large industry - became progressively more serious in their import and in 
personnel involved: May 1993 saw the arrest of the party’s ex-treasurer, Renato Pollini (the 
existing treasurer, Stefanini had long been under investigation) and the party’s controller of 
the cooperatives responsible for construction activities, Fausto Bartolini. In the Summer 
Massimo D ’Alema was implicated in illicit funding activities and rumours abounded that 
Occhetto himself was next on the list (D’Alema was placed officially under investigation by 
the magistrates in January 1994).
The details of this judicial march into the heart of Botteghe oscure (the PDS 
headquarters) are less relevant than its political effects, which were to spark off a big debate 
on the role of the PCI in the ‘First Republic’, and thus the PDS’s electoral credentials. That 
the party had never been totally isolated from a share in state patronage and policy-making 
had long been well known, but the extent to which it may have apparently participated in a 





























































































militants. It was after all Berlinguer who had made la questione morale a crusade for the PCI 
against the traditional parties/The PDS’s critics seized on the opportunity to portray the PCI- 
PDS as never having been different to any of the traditional ruling parties in terms of its 
domestic activities. The allegations, they argued, confirmed that the system was rotten to the 
core and that only genuinely new parties could claim to be apart from the corruption. The 
PDS leadership fought a continual rearguard action to try and prevent these assertions 
sticking. Paradoxically, the thrust of this (evidently) coordinated action was to emphasise 
precisely that which the leadership had been, until then, attempting to overcome: the party’s 
diversità, its distinctiveness from all other political forces. It was argued that there was a 
clear difference between the ‘individual’ or isolated instances of PDS corruption and the 
system of corruption which had been operated by the DC and PSI. There was, furthermore, 
a difference, Cicchetto argued, between what most PDS officials had been charged with - 
violating the law on the financing of parties by accepting undeclared (and therefore illegal) 
contributions to party funds - and that which most DC and PSI officials were charged with: 
corruption through operating a system of kickbacks for personal and party enrichment. The 
PDS, Cicchetto was at pains to stress time and again, had a ‘clean face’; the party had always 
been, and remained, ‘different’ to all the others. Many of the accusations, it was suggested, 
formed part of a plot to prevent the left coming to power.
This position became increasingly unconvincing and difficult to sustain, as the number 
of allegations and arrests climbed the party hierarchy. The absence of any real explanation 
and the silence on the role of Soviet financing left many questions unanswered. More 
importantly, the use of the generic argument of diversità - which justified, for the leadership, 




























































































were to free the party from this type of association. What appeared to be an instrumental use 
of a concept founded on the idea of ‘moral superiority’ not only prompted ferocious criticism 
from various quarters (and particularly from the Lega and the Vatican) but muddied and 
retarded the development of a new culture inside the party, unwittingly giving support to 
those who had opposed the party’s transformation.7 Indeed, the PDS found itself in a 
dilemma from which it was unlikely to escape criticism. On the one hand, to respond to the 
criticism that it was still ‘communist’ the leadership had to argue that it was no longer 
‘different’ to the other parties; on the other hand, to respond to the criticism of systemic 
corruption the leadership argued the reverse. The danger was that it would lose both 
arguments i.e. that it would be perceived as still ‘communist’ but no ‘different’ to the other 
parties when it came to the moral issue. The situation was testing of even the most loyal 
militant and voter.
To summarize this period, the PDS, as the traditional party of opposition, found itself 
unable to exploit fully the collapse of the governing parties and the transition which Italian 
politics was undergoing. Rather than being a forceful agent of change, the party found itself 
continually battling for its own survival, confronted with difficult issues which divided the 
party and left it reacting to changes rather than directing them itself. The party’s difficulties 
in the face of the magistrates’ investigations and allegations confirmed that the PDS had 
(long) ceded the ‘moral issue’ to other political forces, and particularly the Lega. As Salvati 
(1993: 122) notes, ‘there had always been a lot of uneasiness inside the PCI about political 
corruption’. This unease became, in 1992-93, confusion and fear and undermined the attempt 




























































































Realigning the Left and Reassuring the Skeptics (1993-1994)
The defeat, in June 1993, of the PDS’s proposed electoral reform and the subsequent 
approval of a single ballot ‘mixed’ system changed what were indirect pressures on the PDS 
to seek new allies into direct ones. The doppio tumo would have enabled the party to retain 
its independence fully and secure definite allies after the first ballot. Now, all parties, in 
order to survive, had to forge alliances before the first ballot itself took place. The 
Parliament’s decision, then, did not change the PDS’s strategy radically (although, as will 
be seen, it did modify it), but brought it more explicitly out into the open: to establish the 
party as a bona fide  leader of a left of centre majority coalition. This involved, broadly 
speaking, two concomitant sets of activities: first, taking the initiative as the primary party 
of the left to forge such an alliance; second, establishing the PDS’s political and economic 
credentials to lead such an alliance.
The Progressive Alliance
The departure of Segni from AD in September 1993, his launching of the Patto per rinascita 
nazionale (‘Pact for National Renewal’) and discussions with Martinazzoli (signifying the 
formers’ likely return to the centre) presented both a problem and a solution to the PDS. The 
problem was that, until then, an alliance with the influential Segni had been seen as the best 
means of wooing the ‘social centre’: the middle classes who had broken with the old parties 
but who felt no affinity to the Lega or the far left. The solution was that the definitive 
departure of Segni, coupled with the new electoral law and the continued demise of the DC, 
closed down what was always an unlikely coalition (Segni and the PDS) and freed the PDS 
to pursue more vehemently an alliance strategy based on a projected bipolarisation of the 




























































































bipolarisation, and a subtle shift occurred in its strategy towards making a stronger opening 
towards the forces of the centre-left. In late October and early November 1993 Occhetto 
launched the idea of a grand alliance of progressive forces stretching from the left to the 
centre whose objective would be ‘to determine progressively a bipolarisation of the Italian 
political struggle in which the forces which currently occupy the centre will have to make 
the decisive choice of whether to stay with the left or the right.’8 In such an alliance, the 
PDS was willing to give equal dignity to both small and large forces, and the PDS was 
willing to renounce its own symbol for a common symbol in some constituencies. For the 
forces to whom this appeal was addressed (and particularly those to the party’s right) this 
represented an important step. It ended claims to ideological hegemony, and it seemed to 
bury any pretensions to a pure alliance of the left which might then extend towards the centre 
(in two stages), thus apparently ending the PDS’s ostracism of the so-called ‘moderates’.
The problem, however, was what exactly ‘progressive’ meant, or, put another way, 
how far such an alliance should stretch to the left on the one hand and to the centre on the 
other. Occhetto’s response to this question (in an interview in December 1993) was 
conveniently abstract in content. The alliance, he said, would stop moving rightwards ‘at the 
point where the need for efficiency and the market become enemies of the need for 
solidarity’, and it would stop moving leftwards ‘when the need for solidarity and "paradise 
on earth" clashes with the necessity of guaranteeing an orderly economic development which 
aspires to the European model.’9 The PDS wanted all forces of a potential ‘progressive arc’ 
to participate in the formulation of an alliance: the PSI, Rinascita socialista (both of which 
were products of the splitting of the old PSI into four groups), the Rete, the Greens, the 




























































































of one political force by another.
This approach was understandable. On the one hand, the PDS was aware that to 
attract the ‘lost’ voters of the centre, it was essential to include AD and, if possible, the 
Social-Christians who had broken away from the DC (this would also, of course, place 
considerable pressure on Segni to rethink his position). On the other hand, the Spring local 
elections had confirmed that to prevent a significant loss of votes to the left, particularly in 
the regions of the ‘red belt’, the PDS could not afford to exclude Rifondazione comunista 
(RC) from any such alliance. In a sense, the PDS’s own project was a latent compromise 
between two others represented by AD, on the one hand, and RC, on the other, both of 
which should be briefly looked at.
RC’s shift from outright hostility towards the PDS and any notions of an alliance to, 
by late 1993, a position which expressed a willingness to participate in the construction of 
an electoral alliance can be explained by three reasons which were negative in orientation. 
Firstly, it saw the proposals of the right (the Lega and the MSI followed later by Forza 
Italia!) as a threat to Italian democracy. In line, therefore with a long Italian communist 
tradition, it viewed an alliance of all progressive forces to prevent a right-wing victory as 
paramount. Secondly, RC felt that its presence would stop a progressive alliance developing 
in too centrist a direction (it could not hope for anything more than this i.e. a genuine project 
of the left). Thirdly, the new electoral system meant that the party effectively needed allies 
to survive. AD’s project, on the other hand, was to achieve a new social and political 
equilibrium of a reformist type. It viewed the primary danger as coming less from the far 




























































































and the right. The loss of Segni had been a blow to AD, but did not alter its objective, 
particularly as it seemed now that Segni’s project had always been predicated on the unity 
of all catholics, something which was antipathetic to AD. But a genuine reformist alliance 
could only succeed if it attracted the votes of a large proportion of the electorate of the 
centre, and RC’s presence would inevitably undermine this attempt. Indeed, it would involve 
a massive exercise of reassurance about the communists, something confirmed by RC’s 
consistent adoption of positions which were alien to most of its potential alliance partners, 
including the PDS. In domestic policy, RC proposed a tax on Italian Treasury Bonds (the 
‘BOT’), it voted against Ciampi’s Finance Bill and opposed his work on reducing the public 
deficit, it was against the FIAT-trade union accord involving lay offs and work reductions, 
and wanted to see the réintroduction of the scala mobile (wage-indexation system) and a 
shelving of plans to privatise key sectors of industry. In foreign policy, it proposed 
withdrawal from NATO, supported a non-intervention policy in Yugoslavia, and also 
expressed its open support for Castro’s regime in Cuba. In general, its policies were inspired 
by the traditional objective of heightening class struggle.
One can see, therefore, that the PDS’s version of a ‘progressive alliance’ was a 
muddled attempt to avoid the choice between a genuine left-wing alliance (which would 
exclude political forces deemed to be too centrist and would be electorally unrealistic) and 
a genuine (i.e a potential governing) alliance of the centre-left (which would automatically 
exclude RC), by embracing the widest alliance possible. But in doing so, the party was 
confronted with the fact that any such alliance could only be essentially defensive in nature 
i.e. an alliance formed to stop the right electorally rather than actually to govern. There was, 




























































































successful electoral pact (based on a common symbol and stand-down arrangements) could 
be translated into a governmental pact after the elections through the departure of RC.
The formulation of the alliance was, therefore, slow and characterised by intense 
negotiation and conflict in which the question of policies and programme became necessarily 
rather submerged.10 While the PDS leadership was content to see all forces of the potential 
‘progressive arc’ included in an alliance, there were reservations about this from the left of 
the party, and many of the other parties wished to see at least one of the other forces 
excluded. The Rete and the Greens were adamant that the PSI should not be included, despite 
the departure of the craxiani, because of the party’s association with the old order; the PSI 
and AD were vehemently against the inclusion of RC; and about a third of RC was skeptical 
about an operation involving forces which had little or nothing to do with the left. Two 
factors eventually forced the issue. First, in local elections in December the flexible operation 
of tactical alliances by the left led to resounding successes. PDS-led coalitions gained control 
of all six cities where polling took place (Genoa, Naples, Rome, Trieste, Venice and 
Palermo) and 53 out of 129 local governments (with populations over 15,000). This not only 
confirmed that, whatever the difficulties, alliances were essential for a left-wing victory, but 
also that the PDS was the pivot around which any alliance could be built and that 
compromises with what it wanted might have to be made by other political forces (both to 
its left and to its right). Second, the entry of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia! into the political fray 
made the formation of the alliance more pressing. Even though this move tended to confirm 
AD’s fears (of a successful centre-right coalition), the logic of this position (i.e. that a 
positive (governing) coalition should be formed) was not followed through; rather, as Forza 




























































































for a ‘stopping alliance’.
The Progressive Alliance’s programmatic declaration of intent was launched in 
February 1994, and, understandably, focused more on intent than programme. The eight 
parties making up the Alliance were the PDS, PSI, RS (Rinascita socialista), the Rete, the 
Greens, C-S (cnstiano-sociali), AD and RC). The declaration’s main points were: an 
extension of political democracy through a ‘closer relationship between rights and needs’; a 
decentralisation of power; the promotion of economic growth and improvement in the state 
of the public finances; efforts to increase employment; making the economy more dynamic 
through combatting abuses of the welfare state and, where necessary, introducing 
privatisation; protecting the poorest in society; an increase in the drive against corruption; 
improvements in education, training, health and social services; protection of the nation’s 
cultural and environmental heritage. The striking characteristic about this programme was 
its moderation, something confirmed when the PDS’s own election manifesto, closely 
resembling the Progressive’s declaration, was published shortly after. If there was a starting 
point in the declaration of intent it was continuity with Ciampi (although RC vehemently 
denied this) and a recognition that in the existing economic conjuncture there was only a 
limited amount of manoeuvre possible. Indeed, the PDS had constantly argued that Ciampi’s 
was the first government which had made genuine progress in key areas: two successive 
budgets to attack the huge fiscal deficit and government debt, with further cuts in public 
expenditure targeted for the 1994 budget; the beginnings of a privatisation programme 
(banks, insurance companies, industrial firms) to ease the fiscal deficit further and change 
the historic role of the Italian state; labour market reforms to attack structural unemployment; 




























































































and it was even prepared to see Ciampi reappointed as Prime Minister at the head of a 
progressive alliance.
The programme was accompanied by a common symbol (a tri-coloured wave) and 
stand-down arrangements for single-member constituencies. The latter proved far more 
difficult to achieve than in the local elections in December, because each of the parties was 
determined to win as much parliamentary representation as possible. There were fierce 
accusations by the smaller parties, and particularly AD and C-S, of old-style lottizzazione, 
and the arrangements had to be renegotiated at length in February. The constant divisions 
which emerged in the alliance right up to polling day betrayed the fact that the ‘realignment’ 
of the left was primarily a cosmetic operation forced on it by the logic of the new electoral 
system, and that the election result would determine its real future.
The PDS’s Credentials
The slow and painful construction of the alliance was accompanied by a concerted campaign 
by the PDS to establish its credentials with the electorate. This became of primordial 
importance after the local government elections in December when the PDS emerged as a 
prime contender for national government and after the subsequent anti-communist crusade 
embarked on by Forza Italia! and the other forces of the right. The PDS sought to show its 
moral, economic and political credentials to govern. Morally, it continued its campaign (see 
above) which argued that while it was true that there were certain instances of PDS 




























































































DC and PSI. Economically and politically, the party reaffirmed the moderation of its policies 
and its belief that Ciampi’s policies should be the basis of continued renewal, and the 
leadership went about a series of high-level meetings to reassure key economic and political 
elites that the PDS was a reliable political force which no longer presented a threat to the 
establishment. Party delegations met with Confindustria, a number of individual businessmen 
and industrialists, members of the Italian and international financial community, the head of 
the Italian army, and the NATO leadership at its headquarters in Belgium. These 
reassurances, it was argued, were supported by evidence of genuine turnover in the ranks of 
those standing for election: only 94 out of 173 existing deputies were standing again for 
election.
There can be little doubt that the PDS’s campaign to reassert itself in the months 
before the elections had some effect. First, although the party’s position on corruption was 
ultimately unconvincing, local elections and opinion polls confirmed that it was not having 
a detrimental impact on the party’s support. Second, the high-level meetings brought forth 
positive responses from key areas of the establishment. Indeed, by the eve of the election it 
was evident from various public statements that the ‘veto’ on the old PCI of the United States 
government, NATO, Confindustria, the international banking community, the Italian 
industrial community and the old centre parties was, at least informally, a thing of the past. 
The most vivid confirmation of this came, however, not in words but in stocks and shares. 
In late November 1993, when the lira took another dive Occhetto helped stabilise the 
currency by announcing that his party would ensure that the Finance Bill would pass. ‘Incubo 
rosso addio' (‘Farewell to the Red Peril’) proclaimed La Repubblica: after years in which 





























































































now acting as a stabilising force on the markets. In short, in the four and a half years since 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall the party had seen a number of other less visible, but as 
tangible, ‘walls’ fall, providing the party with its first genuine opportunity to reach the long- 
awaited stanza dei bottom (‘control room’). But the electorate necessary to exploit that 
opportunity ultimately proved elusive.
The 1994 Defeat: Causes and Consequences
To most observers the defeat of the left was not unexpected, although its scale perhaps was. 
In relation to the all previous elections in the post-war period the percentage obtained by the 
Progressives (34.6%) was (probably) the lowest ‘the left’ (a changing and unclear concept 
itself) had obtained since the historic 1948 defeat (31%). True, the PDS’s share of the vote 
in the proportional element of the election (which, due to stand-down arrangements in the 
single member constituencies, provides the most accurate comparison with the past) increased 
to 20.4% (from 16.1% in 1992), but this figure has to be seen in the context of a different 
electoral system, the complete transformation of the party system between the two elections 
and the failure of the Progressive Alliance to exploit the collapse in the DC’s and PSI’s vote 
(resulting in a electorally marginal new centre).11 The confirmation, and in some cases 
strengthening of, the PDS heartlands brought little comfort to a party which had missed its 
greatest opportunity since the war to gain power.
Naturally, to a large extent, the left’s defeat is best accounted for through explaining 
the right’s (and particularly Forza Italia's) victory (the subject of a different paper). 




























































































any overall explanation. First, because the Progressive Alliance was made up of several small 
parties, it suffered from the new 4% threshold rule for the proportional element, as all of the 
parties except for the PDS and RC, failed to cross the threshold and obtain seats in the 
proportional allocation.
Second, because the Progressive alliance was formed so late in the day and with such 
difficulty, the ‘joyous war machine’ (as Occhetto described it) never had the time to make 
the transition from tackling its internal problems to a campaigning on the basis of a united 
front. Indeed, the two became hopelessly entangled as the campaign progressed, and RC’s 
position on several issues became clearer. The PDS leadership seemed to spend as much time 
explaining away the differences between RC and the rest of the alliance as it did on 
publicising the policies of the Progressives. The bickering inside the alliance impeded the 
presentation of an effective message to the electorate.
Third, that message was ultimately unconvincing because the Progressives were hardly
--------- {credible as a governing alliance. The vast differences between RC and the other partners on 
various policies confirmed that the formation of a government based on the Alliance was 
unlikely. It is obviously difficult to predict whether there would have been a net gain in votes 
to the Progressives had RC been excluded, but, in the eyes of most of the partners of the 
Alliance and many in the PDS itself, Occhetto’s insistence on the inclusion of RC was the 
primary cause of the defeat. Occhetto was later to pay a high price (his leadership of the 





























































































Fourth, the Progressives appeared leaderless. This was a cost the Alliance bore for 
the PDS renouncing any hegemonic intentions over it, a precondition for some of the 
partners. The natural head of the Alliance, and therefore choice for Prime Minister, was 
Occhetto as leader of the largest party. His name, however, was only put forward as a 
candidate for the premiership with two others, Napolitano and Ciampi, and it was the last 
of these who commandeered most support within the Alliance. Yet, Ciampi was not 
campaigning or running for the Progressives. This situation contrasted strongly with the right 
where (despite protestations to the contrary from the leader of the Lega, Bossi) Berlusconi 
appeared as the leader of the Freedom Alliance and natural candidate for the premiership. 
Berlsuconi was able to personalise the election campaign, something which the Progressives 
could not, and did not want to, do (even though the television debate between Occhetto and
V >
Berlusconi was one of the high points of the campaign). This factor might not have been so 
important had the party system not undergone so much change. But in a campaign where 
three - and primarily two - fixed alliances were campaigning as potential governments in 
waiting, the Progressives appeared to be rooted in the old politics with the direction of the 
Alliance dependent upon the negotiating power of the various party leaders.
This introduces the final reason for the defeat: the PDS was outwitted in its promotion 
of the idea of the bipolarisation of the party system. As already noted, the PDS began to 
pursue this idea in earnest while the centre and the far right were in disarray, and it therefore 
suited the party to be able to present a choice between a united left and an old-style, 
extremist, weak and divided right, with the centre expected to split between the two. 
Berlusconi’s entry into the political arena, however, challenged the PDS on its own chosen 




























































































was found wanting in all respects. Berlusconi was able to polarise the choice between several 
dichotomies and the PDS’s image was always on the wrong side of them.
The first dichotomy was between old and new, Berlusconi claiming the latter. The 
PDS struggled to present itself as something new, but both its association with corruption and 
the general revulsion of the public and the media against partitocrazia (the old ‘rule by 
parties’) left the PDS with an image of being one of the old parties. Indeed, the onslaught 
against the old system by progressive sections of the media tended to undermine those forces 
which they would have favoured for victory.
The second dichotomy was between change and lack of change. Before Berlusconi’s 
entry the PDS was able to present itself as the pivot around which change could be achieved. 
However, Occhetto’s quest for respectability eventually worked against him when the PDS 
had to compete directly with Forza Italia! The mood of the Italian people was for 
discontinuity. The PDS, by the election, stood for ‘continuity with Ciampi’ while Berlusconi 
- through some lavish promises - was able to portray his movement as the essential agent of 
change. Occhetto’s decision, during the campaign, to begin courting the centre parties (when 
he realised that the Progressives were only likely to come to power in such an alliance) 
confirmed for many the impression that this was ‘politics as usual.’
The third dichotomy was between the public and the private sector or the state and 
the market. Berlusconi chose the private sector and the market as his primary terrain from 
where he was able to launch a ferocious assault on the PDS and the Progressives as old-style 




























































































state control had been progressively undermined across the western world. Secondly, the 
specific Italian variant which had developed was completely discredited because it was 
viewed as the source of party control and ensuing corruption. Thirdly, the PDS, as Pasquino 
(1994: 5) points out, had great difficulty in shaking off its association with the state because, 
as a genuine party of the left, it could not simply renounce the philosophy of the value of 
certain forms of state management or control. Yet, fourthly, it saw the force of Berlsuconi’s 
challenge too late to formulate, for the electorate, an effective vision of state regulation 
which would distinguish it from the (corrupt) past and provide a more exciting prospect than 
Berlusconi’s free market economy. In Pasquino’s words (1994: 6):
The Progressives did not know how to forward either their idea of a reformed, 
efficient, incorrupt state or their project for a new people’s politics (in terms 
of behaviour, content and style). The would-be reformers, who were in a 
position to break with the past and lay the foundations for a better Republic, 
appeared - and in a few cases had been and continued to be - participants of 
the system, heirs of the old politics, the supporters of continuity.
The consequences of the defeat for the PDS were predictable. Occhetto’s leadership 
had always been controversial and - in contrast to all previous leaders of the party - never 
free from fierce and open criticism. The 1994 results unleashed a debate on the mistakes of 
the PDS and the Progressive Alliance which echoed much of the pre-election debate. 
Occhetto found himself criticised from the left of his party and the Alliance for failing to 
construct a genuine left-wing alliance and from the right for not pursuing vigorously an 




























































































which followed dealt a mortal blow to Occhetto’s leadership and only excellent results in the 
European elections in June could have saved him. The Progressive Alliance began to 
disintegrate and dissent with the leadership increased inside the party. PDS losses in the 
European elections confirmed the inevitable and Occhetto resigned on a bitter note; similar 
resignations were announced by the leaders of the PSI and AD, Ottaviano Del Turco and 
Wilier Bordon.
Yet, Occhetto’s - and the PDS’s - failure to control and direct the Italian transition 
and thus prevent a right wing outcome, should not go unqualified. Firstly, the historical 
record suggests that the size of the potential left-wing electorate in Italy has rarely been 
above 40% (1976 being the exception), so a successful left-wing alliance was objectively 
always a very difficult task. Second, the tradition of ‘exclusion politics’ (of the left at least) 
was too historically deeply-rooted to be easily overcome in the relatively short period of time 
between 1989 and 1994 to enable a genuine alliance to be created of the forces of the centre 
and the left which might have greater appeal and more numerical force than the right. There 
were too many suspicions and historic reservations on the part of both sides (Segni, 
Martinazzoli, La Malfa etc. on the one hand and Occhetto, Del Turco, Orlando, Bertinotti 
etc. on the other) for any progress of substance to be made in this area. Finally, and perhaps 
more positively, although Occhetto and the PDS failed to gain power they nonetheless 
succeeded in making alternation in government possible, something which had not existed 
before 1989. This can be viewed as a signal achievement of the 1989-94 period. 
Nevertheless, translating this possibility into reality will require considerable work. Before 
anything else, it will require a serious and profound debate on how a modem, reformist and 




























































































situation, comport itself. That debate has yet to begin in earnest.
NOTES
1. Borghini and Magno, in fact, despite being members of the PDS’s executive 
(direzione) were, at the same time, employed by Amato to do specific jobs for him 
as Prime Minister, something justified by Borghini on the grounds that he disagreed 
with his party’s refusal to enter the government (La Repubblica, 6 June 1993).
2. Eugenio Scalfari, ‘Come ai tempi di Moro’, La Repubblica, 30 Aprii 1993.
3. L ’Unità, 11 January 1993 and 20 January 1993.
4. On the general issue of electoral reform see Bull and Newell 1993.
5. See L ’Unità and La Repubblica 26 March 1993.
6. See Della Porta 1993 for an account of the first phase of the magistrates’ action.
7. For good (critical) examples of the PDS’s position see Anseimi 1993 and Colletti 
1993.
8. Quoted in La Repubblica, 4 November 1993.
9. Interview in La Repubblica 9 December 1993.
10. See Rhodes 1994 for an account of the origins of the Progressive Alliance.
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